Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question (Part A) 
 Source : David Bankier, in: Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume 3, Number 1 (1988), pp.1-20. 
 
 
 Abstract 
 This article shows that, unlike the views put forward by functionalist historians, the active involvement of Hitler in anti-Semitic policy can be clearly discerned through a meticulous and detailed analysis of his place in the decision-making process. The anti-Semitic measures were not the implementation of plans devised by the state machinery but a faithful translation of Hitler's wishes. Hitler did not surrender to pressures to radicalise the policy on the Jewish question, neither was he a moderate. He reached temporary compromises without mitigating his determination to solve the Jewish Problem in a final way. The Jews' status in Germany was for him of utmost importance, due to his obsession with racial purity. This issue, therefore, required his personal intervention and was not let to the discretion of the state bureaucracy. 
 An enquiry into this topic may well begin with the question of Hitler's place in the Nazi State. The Hitler-centred, or intentionalist approach assumes that from very early on Hitler contemplated, pursued and strove to achieve his main aim: the destruction of the Jews. In this view, the various stages of the anti-Semitic policy derived directly from his unwavering intentions and the Final Solution was the result of a consistent policy, subject only to tactical deviations which he programmed and had implemented. This school stresses the autonomy of the individual will as the determinant of the course of history, giving a personalised explanation of the anti-Jewish Policy. It sees the anti-Semitic measures as integrally and organically linked to the general Nazi policy, progressively advancing towards long-range final goals out of an inner logic 1 . 
 Structuralist or functionalist historians, on the other hand, emphasise the unsystematic improvisation of the policy, perceived as a series of ad hoc responses of a dis-united governmental machinery with huge management problems. Although this cumbersome administration inevitably produced a radicalisation in anti-Semitic policy, the actual steps were not planned in advance, nor could they be envisaged or predicted. This line of analysis tends to disregard the personal factor, the role of the dictator and his personality in determining and conducting the policy-making process 2 . Karl Schleunes, for example, writes that in the legislation before the Nuremberg Laws, Hitler's hand appeared occasionally at crucial moments, but this hand was usually vacillating and indecisive. He concludes that Hitler's figure is a shadowy one appearing only rarely in the actual making of Jewish policy between 1933 and 1938', and the inconsistencies in the policy-making were a result of his failure to provide guidance. In his opinion, not only was there no planned, directed policy and lack of a comprehensive plan, but, he states categorically, policies were often pursued without the sanction, or indeed the knowledge of the party's central authorities. After the Nuremberg Laws, he says, instead of authority clearly established at the top, there was no authority at all. A decision making vacuum rather than a decision making authority.' 3 Martin Broszat does admit that Hitler's obsessive preoccupation with specific ideological and political principles proved to be a decisive driving force behind Nazi policy, but he shifts the analysis to functional pressures within the regime. In his opinion Hitler sanctioned pressures rather than created policy. Hans Mommsen takes the most extreme view of the functionalist scholars, asserting that the implementation of policy cannot be attributed to Hitler alone, nor to purely ideological factors, but to the fragmented decision-making process. This made for improvised bureaucratic initiatives with their own built-in momentum, promoting a dynamic and cumulative radicalisation also in anti-Semitic policy 4 
 The present paper will not deal with the problems raised by the Hitlerist conception, but with the conclusions of the functionalist approach. 
 Admittedly, functionalist historical research has convincingly demonstrated the coexistence of Hitler's monocratic position and the polycratic structure of the Third Reich. The documentary evidence shows conclusively that the regime was pervaded by a chaotic system of government as Hitler never had any conception of how to govern; upon his assumption of power he simply transferred to the helm of state the methods he had used in conducting the party. The whole system worked, however, because he personally provided the indispensable public charisma, without which his subordinates would have been powerless, while reserving for himself the ultimate decision-making on questions in which he had a paramount interest. What interested him most were foreign, military, racial and antisemitic policies and in these spheres he determined the course of action from above. In the antisemtic policy his intervention had a domino effect: one step led to another. Each step was harsher than the last and each was an outgrowth of the previous one. While one was being implemented the details of the next were being worked out and the next still was on the drawing board of his bureaucrats, who were either acting under his orders or interpreting his wishes. 
 Certainly, there were changes of direction and deviations in the decision-making on the Jewish question, but in order to obtain a better understanding of the apparent inconsistencies in antisemitic policy one must distinguish between Hitler's intentions and his final goals: intentions as actions taken under given circumstances, and final goals as those he believed could be achieved in the absence of external constraints. Achievement of the final goals was therefore postponed until he felt he could overcome the difficulties, brushing them aside. A look at the interaction between Hitler and his hermeneuts in the party and the bureaucracy reveals that the latter were not autonomous but worked under the pressure generated by Hitler's will. 
 Based on the Fuehrerprinzip , the supreme leader acted as the ideological and political originator of antisemtic measures, supplemented by men who wished to prove their diligence, efficiency and indispensability. He approved and sanctioned their work, stamping his own personal imprint on the direction the work had to take. Hitler saw his particular strength in the ability to think consistently and simplify complex problems, deciding matters of political significance and of principle. This, to him, was an integral part of the leadership process. The figure of authority had to provide inspiration and not concern himself with administration. Nor must we ignore his idiosyncrasy as a terrible simplifier', as Hugh Trevor-Roper put it 5 , his staunch aversion to writing, and his deep-rooted impatience with intricate problems. The legislative process thus never varied: Hitler was to be approached only after everyone involved had taken a position on the issue. Proposals were circulated among the pertinent offices concerned, the stumbling blocks were removed, and only then did Hitler give his sanction. 
 One of the salient peculiarities of the Nazi regime was the absence of using common decision-making formulas, as we know them from democratic systems. Instead we find an informal method, whereby Hitler vaguely intimated his view on a certain issue or very generally expressed the course of action to be taken. It was subsequently the task of the policy makers to interpret these “Fuehrer wishes” properly and to give them concrete and practical meaning. Although the wish was always communicated by a third party and not explicitly passed on as a Fuehrer order, it had the force of an order. 
 The fact that the formula “the Fuehrer's wish” was understood by everyone to mean a Fuehrer order is well documented. Dr. Werner Best testified that: from the perspective of those who received the orders, the formulas the Fuehrer wishes ( der Fuehrerwuenscht ) and the Fuehrer ordered ( der Fuehrer hatbefohl ) were perfectly synonymous… the word “wish” was used as an equivalent of “order”.' 6 This testimony is corroborated by countless examples which indicate how the terms wish and order recurred alternatively. For our purposes a few will suffice. 
 For instance, the minutes of the meeting of the Reich Committee for the Protection of German Blood, held on 16 June 1936, show the bureaucracy's speculative interpretation of the wish. On that occasion, Wilhelm Stuckart, Secretary of State of the Ministry of the Interior, dealing with the proposed antisemitic steps, said: I intend to give a directive which, I am convinced corresponds to the Fuehrer's will.' Later, discussing the prevention of marriages between Mischlinge and Germans he added: … in this way we shall most nearly approach the Fuehrer's will.' 7 Or, as Goering put it on 28 December 1938 when he ordered the new discriminatory actions against German Jews: Ich habe die Willensmeinung des Fuehrers in diesen Fragen klar eingeholt .' (I have obtained a clear impression of the Fuehrer's will in these questions) 8 At other times we find measures that do not translate the wish but see in it a term synonymous with Hitler's decision or order. Thus, while dealing with the expulsion of all Jews, Czechs and other foreigners from Vienna, Bormann writes that the Fuehrer wishes ( wuenscht ) to end the differentiation between Reichsdeutsche and Viennese and, a few sentences later, he calls this his decision ( Entscheidung ), and orders the expulsion. Likewise, during the discussion between Hitler, Goering and Goebbels following the Kristallnacht , Goering said The Fuehrer had expressed his wish and ordered that the economic solution also be carried through now.' 9 This one, as well as other laws or regulations, was not the implementation of a plan devised by the state machinery but a faithful translation of Hitler's wish. The bureaucrats obviously tried to excel in servile diligence and opportunism, but they could only gravitate within the strictly circumscribed orbit of their hermeneutic position. They knew perfectly well that in the Nazi scheme of things it was up to the political leader to provide the charisma and the value system, whilst the civil servants merely carried out the administrative tasks necessary to implement these ideals in practice. Naturally, they enjoyed a great deal of open-ended initiative since the whole ethos of Nazism emphasised the spirit rather than the letter of the institutions, thus giving full rein to the individual leader at all levels. 
 Having dealt with this controversial issue, we can now take a closer look at the difficult question of Hitler's role in the concrete measures taken on the Jewish question. Did he intervene in the decision- and policy-making? On what occasions? What was the cause and effect of his intervention, and did it change the direction of the projected policy? The decision on the Final Solution, however, is too complex an issue to be treated within the scope of this paper. We shall concentrate then, on a few select issues: Hitler vis-à-vis the party radicals and bureaucrats, Hitler's image as a moderate and his concrete interventions in antisemitic measures and legislation. 
 The idea to boycott Jewish stores and professionals, on 1 April 1933, was conceived on 26 March when Goebbels was called to Berchtesgaden. The party, at the time, was violently agitating for defensive action against the Jewish international inciting propaganda'. On 28 March, Hitler revealed his official stance on this issue. In the report of the cabinet meeting held the next day, he defended the idea of the boycott, arguing that he had called for it himself 10 The alternative, he suspected, was the eruption of a spontaneous people's movement of undesirable, violent form, whereas an organised and approved boycott, he concluded, would not be intolerably harsh or result in dangerous political turmoil. This representation of the origins of the boycott ostensibly attests to Hitler's vague and unspecified visualisation of the Jewish question. In this view, Hitler showed no specific initiative on the Jewish issue but reacted to, rather than orchestrated, the equivocal, imprecise and repeatedly ambiguous lines of policy which emerged from the bureaucratic offices or the party's quarters. Seen from this angle, the initiatives on antisemitic policy came from below: from the SS, the SD, the bureaucrats or other governmental or party agencies, whose personal rivalries and institutional frictions found an outlet in the Jewish question. Thus, in this particular case, functionalist scholars argue, Hitler called for a boycott in response to the radicals' demands. The thrust originated in the tempestuous outburst of political turbulence, violence and illegal actions and these forced the leader to grant post facto sanction and legitimisation in order to mitigate the popular ferment. Consequently, this argument continues, Hitler's personal role was to moderate rather than to radicalise. I must disagree, however. Hitler was neither a prisoner of forces lacking preconceived, planned goals of his own, nor carried away by events and unwilling to take decisions. He was a creator motivated by ideological obsessions, which became policy when implemented by the party activists. Is it reasonable to suppose that a man who felt himself surrounded by conspiring Jews on all sides would let their fate be decided by petty officials or Nazi hooligans? 
 Hitler cunningly contrived to remain aloof and in the background, but his role of stage manager of these events was carried out behind the scenes and cannot be underestimated. Helmut Genschel seems to be correct in his assessment of the boycott as a phenomenon bearing paradigmatic traits evident also in other antisemitic actions prior to Kristallnacht . These included the forward-pushing action of the propaganda, the effect of the radicals as a precipitating factor, and the effect of the restraining elements in the Nazi government and administration. Most important was the attitude of Hitler, who gave his consent to the action and discussed it with his collaborators (in this case Goebbels or Streicher), but remained in the background creating the false impression that he was “above the details” 11 Moreover, Hitler perceived the boycott as an excellent tool to channel the revolutionary fervour of the SA and other Nazi radicals. And though, at first glance, it may appear that Hitler was forced to yield to the radicals' pressures, this was not the case. The execution of the boycott was much more than a reaction to the pressures exerted upon him. Hitler did not swim with the tide he turned it. For him this was an opportunity to demonstrate his power, using the SA as an instrument of terror rather than being dominated by it and he certainly seized the chance to do so. To this end, the boycott also served a definite, symbolic political function. It was vital for him to show the determination of the new regime both to the German people and abroad; to make plain at the very beginning that the new Germany was ruled by discipline coupled with fierceness. But it served also another, twofold, purpose: to intimidate those who did not share his antisemitic policy, and to accelerate the flight of the Jews from Germany. Finally, his approval made it possible to mask the terror in a facade of legality. Abundant evidence points to the fact that although Hitler was faced by a genuinely difficult internal situation, he certainly had enough power to ignore the radicals and follow the advice of Foreign Minister von Neurath at the cabinet meeting on 31 March, if he so desired. He actually did so a year later, when militant Nazi elements of the NS-HAGO (National-Socialist Trade Commerce and Industry Organisation) attempted to stage a similar boycott between 23 March and 6 April 1934. In this instance the Fuehrer's Deputy, Rudolf Hess, warned the Gauleiters that such action was contrary to the Fuehrer's wish and it was instantly stopped 12 This stand, as we learn, was adopted not out of moderation but out of tactical consideration. In a speech to the Reichsstatthalter (Nazi r) on 23 March 1934, Hitler took a firm position against boycott attempts which, he was convinced, could endanger the import of raw material 13 Echoing Hitler, Hans Frank, the Bavarian Minister of Justice, also warned against the over-zealous National Socialists who had unleashed an antisemitic boycott in the city of Weimar the previous week. At this juncture, as in 1933, there were foreign policy considerations as well. However, whereas in the former instance Hitler found it more opportune to satisfy the radicals and demonstrate his power right at the beginning of his reign, in the latter he considered it more prudent to give priority to tactical pragmatism than to please the party radicals. They had to wait to get their share when objective circumstances would become more propitious. 
 This was not the only time that Hitler acted against the radical thrust, adopting a pragmatic stand. His independent policy-making manifests itself also in decisions on the department stores, a central theme in the radical agitation in the summer of 1933. At a meeting with the Minister of Economics, Kurt Schmidt, Hitler accepted Schmidt's pragmatic view and approved an additional 14.5 million RM of credit to the Jewish owned department store chain Tietz, displaying an autonomous decision in the choice between ideological purity and the needs of the moment. This step was undoubtedly, once more, a result of Hitler's talks with Schmidt on the necessity to protect Germany's economy. 14 Hitler's independence of the party's radical drives on this issue, is equally clear from his decision at the beginning of October 1934 to permit civil servants to continue shopping at Jewish department and other stores, despite the activists' agitation to prohibit this. 15 These examples aptly reflect Hitler's opportunism as a skilful tactician, waiting until the time was absolutely ripe before making his next antisemitic move. He was fully aware of the price he had to pay in the transition from the movement's agitation to governmental consolidation, and of the disparity between his final goals and their transition into the concrete political reality. 
 Following the Nuremberg Laws, more attempts were made to issue antisemitic laws in the economic field and it was always Hitler who made the final decision in his Fuehrerbesprechungen (Fuehrer consultations). His decisions in support of Reichsbankpraesident Hjalmar Schacht, against party pressures, again show the impact of export, foreign currency, and similar considerations on his scale of priorities. 
 A striking example of Hitler's unshakeable resolve despite party pressure, is the issue of pensions to Jews in Germany. As is well known, privileged Jews who were ousted from the civil service continued to receive pensions, a situation opposed by the bureaucracy and the party officials. In November 1939, for instance, Hans Pfundtner, Secretary of State of the Ministry of the Interior, proposed to Chief of the Chancellery Hans Lammers to reduce the pension payments and, some time later, a similar suggestion came from the Postal Minister who argued that since the Jews would be put in camps, or the like, during the war, their pensions would be withdrawn in any case. 16 The attempt to stop the payments received further impetus at the start of the deportations of German Jews. On 9 June 1941, Pfundtner informed Lammers of the independent initiative taken by the mayor of Berlin to stop the pension payments to Jews as of January 1942. The mayor's move was motivated by what he termed an “unbearable situation”; namely, that whereas pensions were stopped to Jews who left or were deported to the East, German Jews were still receiving their pensions from the state treasury. His action was based on two reasons: from a political vantage point he believed that at the end of the winter the Jews would be sent to the East anyhow and, out of practical considerations, he anchored his order on financial arguments - the lack of funds in time of war. 17 The mayor's aggressive initiative met with the opposition from the Ministry of Interior which asked him to rescind the order, reminding him that on 8 April 1941, as part of the discussions over the eleventh implementation ordinance to the Nuremberg Laws, which would have had a direct bearing on the pension issue, Hitler had decided not to change the status quo in this matter. His decision was aimed at avoiding complications. 18 The issue was also raised on various occasions by the party Gauleitungen . Gauleitung Baden and the Gau in Berlin deplored the fact that in their jurisdiction there were Jews still receiving pensions. Hess himself also communicated to the Ministry of Interior that party reports spoke of public bewilderment as to why Jews still received pensions. It would be desirable to clarify the matter, he added, since various governmental and party agencies incessantly requested that it be solved. Against this background the decision to put an end to the discussions of the topic becomes clear 19 In July 1942, Lammers informed the Ministry of Interior that, in accord with Bormann, all attempts to introduce changes in this matter should cease. Both thought that Hitler would not sanction the initiative taken by the mayor of Berlin 20 The issue was finally discussed in a special session devoted by Lammers and Bormann to the “Final Solution” on 2 October 1943. In his memorandum Bormann pointed out that Hitler was not willing to change his mind on the pension issue. Therefore, Bormann and Lammers ordered that all proposals to change the legislation on this matter should definitely be abandoned 21 
 
 
 References: 
 
 
 1. See for example: Gerald L. Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Eberhard Jaeckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung , Tuebingen: R. Wunderlich, 1969). 
 2. The major exponents of this position are: Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970); Uwe D. Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Duesseldorf: Droste, 1972); Hans Mommsen, The Realisation of the Unthinkable', in Gerhard Hirschfeld (Ed.), The Politics of Genocide (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986) pp. 97–144, just to mention one of his many works; for a moderate functionalist view, see Christopher R. Browning, Fateful Months (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985); on these two schools: Saul Friedlaender, “From Anti-Semitism to Extermination”, Yad Vashem Studies 16 (1984), 1–50. 
 3. Schleunes, op. cit. , pp. 131, 258–9. 
 4.Martin Broszat, “Soziale Motivation und Fuehrer-Bindung des Nationalsozialismus”, Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 18 (1970), 392–409; Mommsen, op. cit. 
 5. Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, “The Mind of Adolf Hitler”, Hitler's Table Talk (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p. xxxi. 
 6. Quoted in Fleming, op. cit. , pp. 45–6. 
 7. Nuremberg Document (hereafter ND), NG-289. 
 8. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (hereafter BA), R 18/5519. 
 9. IMT 9, p. 278. 
 10.BA R 43 I/1460. 
 11.Helmut Genschel, Die Verdraengung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im DriReich (Goettingen: Musterschmidt, 1966), p. 58. 
 12.Hessto Gauleiters, BA NS 6/216, cf. the note of Ministerialrat Willuhn, 26 March 1934, BA R 43 II/602; cf. Hitler's address to Reichsstatthalter on 23 March 1934 in which he supported Schacht's stand against the boycott, reported in The Jewish Chronicle , 30 March 1934. 
 13.Konrad Repgen (Ed.), Akten der Reichskanzlei (Boppard a/Rh.: Boldt), p. xxiii. 
 14.Genschel, op. cit. , p. 80. 
 15.Bormann to Reichsstatthalter Loepper, Dessau-Ziebigk 13 January 1933, BA NS 6/ vol 215. The question whether civil servants were allowed to shop at Jewish stores was raised again on many occasions during the turbulent months of 1935 following the instructions of the Reichsverwaltung des Deutschen Beamtenbundes (National Administration of the German Union of Civil Servants) on 7 February 1935 to refrain from buying there. These initiatives were opposed by the central authorities, influenced by economic considerations. This was the case in Westfalia, when the DAF (German Labour Front) forced civil servants to undersign a declaration that they would refrain from shopping in Jewish stores. The step brought in its wake the intervention of Hess. 
 16.16Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 57. 
 17.The mayor based his action on the 10th clause of the 11th implementation ordinance to the Citizenship Laws, and the secret decree of the Ministry of the Interior of 3 December 1941 to stop payments to Jews who lost their citizenship due to their emigration or deportation to the East, Pfundtner to Lammers, 9 June 1941; Mayor of Berlin to Ministry of the Interior, 23 March 1942. BA R 43 II/449. 
 18.This step also clashed with the agency in charge to solve the Jewish question: the SD. If the state was not to pay the pensions who would care for their maintenance claimed Eichmann's office? See Heydrich's intervention on 26 February 1942 that such an action will lay a heavy burden on the Reichsvereinigung's budget. Ibid. 
 19. Hess to Ministry of the Interior, 23 March 1941; Bormann to Lammers, 17 July and 4 August 1943; Lammers to Ministry of the Interior, 24 July 1943, ibid. 
 20. Lammers to Ministry of the Interior, 20 July 1942, ibid. 
 21. Memorandum, FQ 6 October 1943, ibid.